Phenoscopy includes the observation of many kinds of appearing. We might begin with a percept. For instance, you might close your eyes and notice some sound that you hear.
I hear the call of a crow.
Or rather, i call it that, because the sound reminds me of a kind of large black bird that i’ve seen and heard before.
What i heard just now was an instance, a manifestation, of that general type of sound. Like every percept, it appeared momentarily, and then vanished into a timespace we call the past.
What i have in mind now is a memory trace of it, which purports to represent the actual event. This is a phenomenon, an appearance, very different from what i actually heard, but connected with it by a shared quality of sound.
Of course, my memory of the sound does not appear to you at all. If you have a roughly similar memory of a similar event, and the words ‘call of a crow’ evoked that memory for you, it’s likely that the quality we are talking about is an element of all three phenomena: the call of the crow, my memory of it, and your memory of crow calls. It is not likely that the quality of all three is exactly the same: all similarity is more or less vague. But we can generalize to say that any phenomenon, anything that appears in any way, must have some quality.
That quality is the Firstness of the appearing, in Peircean terms. At the highest level of phenoscopic generality, we can call this Firstness an element of the phenomenon – of any possible appearing.
It is not the only element. The actuality of the sound i heard, breaking the stillness of a particular Sunday morning in the woods where i live, was another element of its appearing. We might call that element its otherness, the fact of its forcing itself upon my attention and altering the course of my stream of consciousness. Peirce called this element its Secondness because, unlike its Firstness (‘which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else’), it can be what it is only by being second to, or other than, something else. In this case, the actuality or Secondness of the sound was its otherness to the soundscape it broke into, including the sounds occurring before and after it. Likewise, but more generally, the Secondness of an existing thing is its otherness or reactivity to other things in the same universe.
One more element of the phenomenon appeared when i recognized the sound as that of a crow. A connection appeared between a unique event and a familiar concept, so that the event in its Secondness appeared as an instance of the type represented by that concept. This is different from the way existing things relate to, or react to, one another. A recognition is a perceptual judgment, and brings the element of generality into the phenomenon which i said i heard. Then i represented my judgment to you by naming it ‘the call of a crow,’ which in turn activated whatever concept you would give that name to. That ‘activation’ was the Secondness of the phenomenon of your meaning something by those words, something more or less similar in quality to my meaning something when i wrote them. That quality is the Firstness of this appearing, this experience of meaning that we share. The other element of this phenomenon is its Thirdness, which is not its quality or its actuality but its ability to represent a second “thing” to a third “thing.” Peirce sometimes calls it ‘thought’: ‘It is genuine Thirdness that gives thought its characteristic, although Thirdness consists in nothing but one thing’s bringing two into a Secondness’ (EP2:269).